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PLoS Med. 2019 Mar 19;16(3):e1002761. doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002761. eCollection 2019 Mar.

Cost-effectiveness of financial incentives for improving diet and health through Medicare and Medicaid: A microsimulation study.

Author information

1
Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, Tufts University, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America.
2
Brigham and Women's Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America.
3
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America.

Abstract

BACKGROUND:

Economic incentives through health insurance may promote healthier behaviors. Little is known about health and economic impacts of incentivizing diet, a leading risk factor for diabetes and cardiovascular disease (CVD), through Medicare and Medicaid.

METHODS AND FINDINGS:

A validated microsimulation model (CVD-PREDICT) estimated CVD and diabetes cases prevented, quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), health-related costs (formal healthcare, informal healthcare, and lost-productivity costs), and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) of two policy scenarios for adults within Medicare and Medicaid, compared to a base case of no new intervention: (1) 30% subsidy on fruits and vegetables ("F&V incentive") and (2) 30% subsidy on broader healthful foods including F&V, whole grains, nuts/seeds, seafood, and plant oils ("healthy food incentive"). Inputs included national demographic and dietary data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 2009-2014, policy effects and diet-disease effects from meta-analyses, and policy and health-related costs from established sources. Overall, 82 million adults (35-80 years old) were on Medicare and/or Medicaid. The mean (SD) age was 68.1 (11.4) years, 56.2% were female, and 25.5% were non-whites. Health and cost impacts were simulated over the lifetime of current Medicare and Medicaid participants (average simulated years = 18.3 years). The F&V incentive was estimated to prevent 1.93 million CVD events, gain 4.64 million QALYs, and save $39.7 billion in formal healthcare costs. For the healthy food incentive, corresponding gains were 3.28 million CVD and 0.12 million diabetes cases prevented, 8.40 million QALYs gained, and $100.2 billion in formal healthcare costs saved, respectively. From a healthcare perspective, both scenarios were cost-effective at 5 years and beyond, with lifetime ICERs of $18,184/QALY (F&V incentive) and $13,194/QALY (healthy food incentive). From a societal perspective including informal healthcare costs and lost productivity, respective ICERs were $14,576/QALY and $9,497/QALY. Results were robust in probabilistic sensitivity analyses and a range of one-way sensitivity and subgroup analyses, including by different durations of the intervention (5, 10, and 20 years and lifetime), food subsidy levels (20%, 50%), insurance groups (Medicare, Medicaid, and dual-eligible), and beneficiary characteristics within each insurance group (age, race/ethnicity, education, income, and Supplemental Nutrition Assistant Program [SNAP] status). Simulation studies such as this one provide quantitative estimates of benefits and uncertainty but cannot directly prove health and economic impacts.

CONCLUSIONS:

Economic incentives for healthier foods through Medicare and Medicaid could generate substantial health gains and be highly cost-effective.

Conflict of interest statement

I have read the journal's policy and the authors of this manuscript have the following competing interests: RM reports research funding from NIH, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and Unilever and personal fees from the World Bank and Bunge. DM reports research funding from the National Institutes of Health and the Gates Foundation; personal fees from GOED, Nutrition Impact, Pollock Communications, Bunge, Indigo Agriculture, Amarin, Acasti Pharma, Cleveland Clinic Foundation, America’s Test Kitchen, and Danone; scientific advisory board, Elysium Health (with stock options), Omada Health, and DayTwo; and chapter royalties from UpToDate, all outside the submitted work. TAG has also received research funds and/or consulting fees from Astra Zeneca, Novartis, United Health Group, Teva Pharmacueticals, and Takeda in the past five years, all of which were outside the submitted work.

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