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Bull Math Biol. 2018 Oct;80(10):2580-2599. doi: 10.1007/s11538-018-0476-5. Epub 2018 Sep 10.

A Game-Theoretic Model of Cholera with Optimal Personal Protection Strategies.

Author information

1
Department of Applied Mathematics, Wentworth Institute of Technology, Boston, MA, 02115, USA.
2
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, 27402, USA.
3
Department of Biological Sciences, Winston-Salem State University, Winston-Salem, NC, 27110, USA.
4
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, 27402, USA. igor@uncg.edu.

Abstract

Cholera is an acute gastro-intestinal infection that affects millions of people throughout the world each year, primarily but not exclusively in developing countries. Because of its public health ramifications, considerable mathematical attention has been paid to the disease. Here we consider one neglected aspect of combating cholera: personal participation in anti-cholera interventions. We construct a game-theoretic model of cholera in which individuals choose whether to participate in either vaccination or clean water consumption programs under assumed costs. We find that relying upon individual compliance significantly lowers the incidence of the disease as long as the cost of intervention is sufficiently low, but does not eliminate it. The relative costs of the measures determined whether a population preferentially adopts a single preventative measure or employs the measure with the strongest early adoption.

KEYWORDS:

Cholera; ESS; Game theory; Personal protection; Vaccination

PMID:
30203140
DOI:
10.1007/s11538-018-0476-5
[Indexed for MEDLINE]

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