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J Appl Philos. 2017 Feb;34(2):172-190. doi: 10.1111/japp.12172. Epub 2016 Feb 8.

Epistemic Injustice and Illness.

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Department of Philosophy University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD UK.
Department of Philosophy University of Bristol Cotham House Cotham BS6 6JL UK.


This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. We claim that these stereotypes and structural features render ill persons especially vulnerable to these two types of epistemic injustice. We end by proposing five avenues for further work on epistemic injustice in healthcare.

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