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Sci Rep. 2014 Jul 25;4:5824. doi: 10.1038/srep05824.

Evaluation of transmission risks associated with in vivo replication of several high containment pathogens in a biosafety level 4 laboratory.

Author information

1
1] Special Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba [2].
2
Special Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba.
3
Containment Services, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba.
4
Bioforensics Assay Development and Diagnostics; Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba.
5
1] Special Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba [2] Departments of Medical Microbiology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada.
6
1] Special Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba [2] Departments of Medical Microbiology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada [3] Departments of Pediatrics and Child Health, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada.
7
1] Special Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba [2] Departments of Medical Microbiology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada [3] Departments of Immunology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada [4] Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, Philadelphia, PA, USA.

Abstract

Containment level 4 (CL4) laboratories studying biosafety level 4 viruses are under strict regulations to conduct nonhuman primate (NHP) studies in compliance of both animal welfare and biosafety requirements. NHPs housed in open-barred cages raise concerns about cross-contamination between animals, and accidental exposure of personnel to infectious materials. To address these concerns, two NHP experiments were performed. One examined the simultaneous infection of 6 groups of NHPs with 6 different viruses (Machupo, Junin, Rift Valley Fever, Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever, Nipah and Hendra viruses). Washing personnel between handling each NHP group, floor to ceiling biobubble with HEPA filter, and plexiglass between cages were employed for partial primary containment. The second experiment employed no primary containment around open barred cages with Ebola virus infected NHPs 0.3 meters from naïve NHPs. Viral antigen-specific ELISAs, qRT-PCR and TCID50 infectious assays were utilized to determine antibody levels and viral loads. No transmission of virus to neighbouring NHPs was observed suggesting limited containment protocols are sufficient for multi-viral CL4 experiments within one room. The results support the concept that Ebola virus infection is self-contained in NHPs infected intramuscularly, at least in the present experimental conditions, and is not transmitted to naïve NHPs via an airborne route.

PMID:
25059478
PMCID:
PMC5376055
DOI:
10.1038/srep05824
[Indexed for MEDLINE]
Free PMC Article

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