Format

Send to

Choose Destination
See comment in PubMed Commons below
Med Health Care Philos. 2014 Nov;17(4):529-40. doi: 10.1007/s11019-014-9560-2.

Epistemic injustice in healthcare: a philosophial analysis.

Author information

1
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, Bristol, BS6 6JL, UK, havi.carel@bristol.ac.uk.

Abstract

In this paper we argue that ill persons are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice in the sense articulated by Fricker (Epistemic injustice. Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). Ill persons are vulnerable to testimonial injustice through the presumptive attribution of characteristics like cognitive unreliability and emotional instability that downgrade the credibility of their testimonies. Ill persons are also vulnerable to hermeneutical injustice because many aspects of the experience of illness are difficult to understand and communicate and this often owes to gaps in collective hermeneutical resources. We then argue that epistemic injustice arises in part owing to the epistemic privilege enjoyed by the practitioners and institutions of contemporary healthcare services--the former owing to their training, expertise, and third-person psychology, and the latter owing to their implicit privileging of certain styles of articulating and evidencing testimonies in ways that marginalise ill persons. We suggest that a phenomenological toolkit may be part of an effort to ameliorate epistemic injustice.

PMID:
24740808
DOI:
10.1007/s11019-014-9560-2
[Indexed for MEDLINE]
PubMed Commons home

PubMed Commons

0 comments
How to join PubMed Commons

    Supplemental Content

    Full text links

    Icon for Springer
    Loading ...
    Support Center