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Cogn Neurosci. 2014;5(2):122-4. doi: 10.1080/17588928.2014.905519. Epub 2014 Apr 7.

How does the brain encode epistemic reliability? Perceptual presence, phenomenal transparency, and counterfactual richness.

Author information

1
a Philosophisches Seminar, Gutenberg Research College , Johannes Gutenberg-Universit├Ąt , Mainz , Germany.

Abstract

Seth develops a convincing and detailed internalist alternative to the sensorimotor-contingency theory of perceptual phenomenology. However, there are remaining conceptual problems due to a semantic ambiguity in the notion of "presence" and the idea of "subjective veridicality." The current model should be integrated with the earlier idea that experiential "realness" and "mind-independence" are determined by the unavailability of earlier processing stages to attention. Counterfactual richness and attentional unavailability may both be indicators of the overall processing level currently achieved, a functional property that normally correlates with epistemic reliability. Perceptual presence as well as phenomenal transparency express epistemic reliability on the level of conscious processing.

PMID:
24702471
DOI:
10.1080/17588928.2014.905519
[Indexed for MEDLINE]

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