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Prev Vet Med. 2014 Feb 1;113(2):175-84. doi: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2013.11.001. Epub 2013 Nov 13.

The risk of rinderpest re-introduction in post-eradication era.

Author information

1
Veterinary Epidemiology, Economics and Public Health Group, Department of Production and Population Health, Royal Veterinary College, Hawkshead Lane, North Mymms, AL9 7TA Hatfield, United Kingdom. Electronic address: gfournie@rvc.ac.uk.
2
Veterinary Epidemiology, Economics and Public Health Group, Department of Production and Population Health, Royal Veterinary College, Hawkshead Lane, North Mymms, AL9 7TA Hatfield, United Kingdom.
3
Animal Production and Health Division, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations - Headquarters, Viale delle Terme di Caracalla, 00153 Rome, Italy.
4
AusVet Animal Health Services, 140 Falls Road, Wentworth Falls, New South Wales 2782, Australia.

Abstract

In 2011, ten years after the last reported outbreak, the eradication of rinderpest was declared. However, as rinderpest virus stocks still exist, there remains a risk of rinderpest re-introduction. A semi-quantitative risk assessment was conducted to assess this risk, which was defined as the probability of at least one host becoming infected and infectious outside a laboratory anywhere in the world within a one-year period. Pathways leading to rinderpest re-introduction were: deliberate or accidental use of virus in laboratories, deliberate or accidental use of vaccines, host exposure to an environmental source of virus, and use of virus for anti-animal biological warfare. The probability of each pathway step occurring was estimated through expert opinion elicitation. The risk estimate was associated with a high degree of uncertainty. It was estimated to range from negligible to high, with the median being very low. The accidental use of laboratory virus stocks was the highest risk pathway. Reducing the number of virus stocks and restricting their use, as well as upgrading the laboratories to a higher biosafety level, would effectively decrease the maximum and median risks. Likewise, ensuring that remaining vaccine stocks are not used and are instead destroyed or relocated to a limited number of regional repositories would also have a major effect on these estimates. However, these measures are unlikely to eliminate the risk of rinderpest re-introduction so that maintaining response preparedness is essential.

KEYWORDS:

Eradication; Expert opinion; Re-introduction; Rinderpest; Risk assessment; Semi-quantitative model

PMID:
24299903
DOI:
10.1016/j.prevetmed.2013.11.001
[Indexed for MEDLINE]

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