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J Med Philos. 2013 Oct;38(5):487-500. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jht043. Epub 2013 Aug 29.

Differential diagnosis and the suspension of judgment.

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1
*University of South Carolina, Center for Bioethics, 1600 Hampton Street, Suite 409, Columbia, SC 29208, USA. ashleygrahamkennedy@gmail.com.

Abstract

In this paper I argue that ethics and evidence are intricately intertwined within the clinical practice of differential diagnosis. Too often, when a disease is difficult to diagnose, a physician will dismiss it as being "not real" or "all in the patient's head." This is both an ethical and an evidential problem. In the paper my aim is two-fold. First, via the examination of two case studies (late-stage Lyme disease and Addison's disease), I try to elucidate why this kind of dismissal takes place. Then, I propose a potential solution to the problem. I argue that instead of dismissing a patient's illness as "not real," physicians ought to exercise a compassionate suspension of judgment when a diagnosis cannot be immediately made. I argue that suspending judgment has methodological, epistemic, and ethical virtues and therefore should always be preferred to patient dismissal in the clinical setting.

KEYWORDS:

diagnosis; epistemology; ethics; evidence; physician-patient relationship; respect; virtues

PMID:
23990663
DOI:
10.1093/jmp/jht043
[Indexed for MEDLINE]
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