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MBio. 2012 Oct 9;3(5). pii: e00290-12. doi: 10.1128/mBio.00290-12.

Biocontainment in gain-of-function infectious disease research.

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1
Columbia University, New York, New York, USA.

Abstract

The discussion of H5N1 influenza virus gain-of-function research has focused chiefly on its risk-to-benefit ratio. Another key component of risk is the level of containment employed. Work is more expensive and less efficient when pursued at biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) than at BSL-3 or at BSL-3 as modified for work with agricultural pathogens (BSL-3-Ag). However, here too a risk-to-benefit ratio analysis is applicable. BSL-4 procedures mandate daily inspection of facilities and equipment, monitoring of personnel for signs and symptoms of disease, and logs of dates and times that personnel, equipment, supplies, and samples enter and exit containment. These measures are not required at BSL-3 or BSL-3-Ag. Given the implications of inadvertent or deliberate release of high-threat pathogens with pandemic potential, it is imperative that the World Health Organization establish strict criteria for biocontainment that can be fairly applied in the developing world, as well as in more economically developed countries.

PMID:
23047747
PMCID:
PMC3484385
DOI:
10.1128/mBio.00290-12
[Indexed for MEDLINE]
Free PMC Article
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