The incidence of 'job lock' in the health insurance context has long been viewed as a potential problem with employer-provided health insurance, a concept that was instrumental in the passage of the United States Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, and later, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act in 1996. Several recent developments in healthcare in the USA include declining healthcare coverage and a noticeable shift in the burden of medical care costs to employees. If these developments cause employees with employer-provided health insurance to feel locked into their jobs, optimal job matches in the labor force may not take place. A summary of the seminal papers in the current literature on the topic of job lock is given, followed by an empirical exercise using single individuals from the National Health Interview Survey (1997-2003) and the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1989-2000). Econometric methods used include difference in differences, ordinary least squares and individual fixed effects models, in gauging the potential effect that employer-provided health insurance may have on job tenure and voluntary job departure. Our findings are consistent with recent assertions that there is some evidence of job lock. Individuals with employer-provided health insurance stay on the job 16% longer and are 60% less likely to voluntarily leave their jobs than those with insurance that is not provided by their employers. Productivity may not be optimal if incentives are altered owing to the existence of fringe benefits, such as health insurance. Further research in this area should determine whether legislation beyond the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act laws is needed.