Format

Send to

Choose Destination
See comment in PubMed Commons below
J Health Econ. 2009 Mar;28(2):290-304. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.11.004. Epub 2008 Dec 3.

Rationing the public provision of healthcare in the presence of private supplements: evidence from the Italian NHS.

Author information

1
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy. d.fabbri@unibo.it

Abstract

In this paper we assess the relative effectiveness of user charges and administrative waiting times as a tool for rationing public healthcare in Italy. We measure demand elasticities by estimating a simultaneous equation model of GP primary care visits, public specialist consultations and private specialist consultations, as if they were part of an incomplete system of demand. We find that for public specialist consultations, own price elasticity of demand is about -0.3, while elasticity to administrative waiting time is about -.04. No substitution exists between the demand for public and private specialists, so that user charges act as a net deterrent for over-consumption. The public provision of healthcare does not induce the wealthy to opt out. Moreover our evidence suggests that user charges and waiting lists do not serve redistributive purposes.

PMID:
19135274
DOI:
10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.11.004
[Indexed for MEDLINE]
PubMed Commons home

PubMed Commons

0 comments
How to join PubMed Commons

    Supplemental Content

    Full text links

    Icon for Elsevier Science
    Loading ...
    Support Center