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Trends Cogn Sci. 2009 Jan;13(1):1-6. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.09.006. Epub 2008 Dec 6.

The role of emotion in moral psychology.

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1
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155, USA. huebner@wjh.harvard.edu

Abstract

Recent work in the cognitive and neurobiological sciences indicates an important relationship between emotion and moral judgment. Based on this evidence, several researchers have argued that emotions are the source of our intuitive moral judgments. However, despite the richness of the correlational data between emotion and morality, we argue that the current neurological, behavioral, developmental and evolutionary evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that emotion is necessary for making moral judgments. We suggest instead, that the source of moral judgments lies in our causal-intentional psychology; emotion often follows from these judgments, serving a primary role in motivating morally relevant action.

PMID:
19058993
DOI:
10.1016/j.tics.2008.09.006
[Indexed for MEDLINE]
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