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Trends Cogn Sci. 2009 Jan;13(1):7-13. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003. Epub 2008 Dec 6.

Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood.

Author information

1
Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. olaf.blanke@epfl.ch

Abstract

We highlight the latest research on body perception and self-consciousness, but argue that despite these achievements, central aspects have remained unexplored, namely, global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Researchers investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behaviour. We ask, what are the minimally sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self, that is, the fundamental conscious experience of being someone? What are necessary conditions for self-consciousness in any type of system? We offer conceptual clarifications, discuss recent empirical evidence from neurology and cognitive science and argue that these findings offer a new entry point for the systematic study of global and more fundamental aspects of self-consciousness.

PMID:
19058991
DOI:
10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003
[Indexed for MEDLINE]

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