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Conscious Cogn. 2008 Jun;17(2):438-50. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.011. Epub 2008 Apr 10.

Minds, persons, and space: an fMRI investigation into the relational complexity of higher-order intentionality.

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  • 1Department of Cognitive Neurology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Stephanstr. 1a, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany. abraham@cbs.mpg.de

Abstract

Mental state reasoning or theory-of-mind has been the subject of a rich body of imaging research. Although such investigations routinely tap a common set of regions, the precise function of each area remains a contentious matter. With the help of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we sought to determine which areas are involved when processing mental state or intentional metarepresentations by focusing on the relational aspect of such representations. Using non-intentional relational representations such as spatial relations between persons and between objects as a contrast, the results ascertained the involvement of the precuneus, the temporal poles, and the medial prefrontal cortex in the processing of intentional representations. In contrast, the anterior superior temporal sulcus and the left temporo-parietal junction were implicated when processing representations that refer to the presence of persons in relational contexts in general. The right temporo-parietal junction, however, was specifically activated for persons entering spatial relations. The level of representational complexity, a previously unexplored factor, was also found to modulate the neural response in some brain regions, such as the medial prefrontal cortex and the right temporo-parietal junction. These findings highlight the need to take into account the critical roles played by an extensive network of neural regions during mental state reasoning.

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