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J Health Econ. 2005 Sep;24(5):907-30.

Physician reimbursement and technology adoption.

Author information

  • 1Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstr. 28 VG, D-80539 Munich, Germany. astrid.selder@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

Abstract

This study analyses the incentives of health care providers to adopt new technologies in a world with ex-post moral hazard. It is shown that in a second best efficient world with respect to insurance coverage, a linear remuneration scheme implements the adoption of second best efficient technologies only in special cases. Under a (third best) standard coinsurance contract, the adequate reimbursement rule is characterised depending on the characteristics of the technology and on patients' demand elasticities with respect to monetary and non-monetary costs. A shift from fee-for-service to capitation is likely to display undesirable incentives for very severe illnesses by inducing a reduction in the technically feasible level of healing or an increase in non-monetary costs of treatment.

PMID:
15927287
DOI:
10.1016/j.jhealeco.2005.03.004
[PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
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