Format

Send to

Choose Destination
See comment in PubMed Commons below
Bull Math Biol. 2004 Nov;66(6):1621-44.

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations.

Author information

1
Department of Mathematics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. ctaylor@math.mit.edu

Abstract

We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary game dynamics among two strategies. For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior.

PMID:
15522348
DOI:
10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004
[Indexed for MEDLINE]
PubMed Commons home

PubMed Commons

0 comments
How to join PubMed Commons

    Supplemental Content

    Loading ...
    Support Center