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Emerg Infect Dis. 2001 Nov-Dec;7(6):959-69.

Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon.

Author information

1
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atalnta, Georgia 30333, USA.qzm4@cdc.gov

Abstract

We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to <0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by > or = 33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate.

PMID:
11747722
PMCID:
PMC2631899
DOI:
10.3201/eid0706.010607
[Indexed for MEDLINE]
Free PMC Article

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