Scientific advances over the past several decades have accelerated the ability to engineer existing organisms and to potentially create novel ones not found in nature. Synthetic biology, which collectively refers to concepts, approaches, and tools that enable the modification or creation of biological organisms, is being pursued overwhelmingly for beneficial purposes ranging from reducing the burden of disease to improving agricultural yields to remediating pollution. Although the contributions synthetic biology can make in these and other areas hold great promise, it is also possible to imagine malicious uses that could threaten U.S. citizens and military personnel. Making informed decisions about how to address such concerns requires a realistic assessment of the capabilities that could be misused. Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology explores and envisions potential misuses of synthetic biology. This report develops a framework to guide an assessment of the security concerns related to advances in synthetic biology, assesses the levels of concern warranted for such advances, and identifies options that could help mitigate those concerns.

Contents

• The National Academies of SCIENCES • ENGINEERING • MEDICINE
• COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIES FOR IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL BIODEFENSE VULNERABILITIES POSED BY SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
• BOARD ON CHEMICAL SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY
• BOARD ON LIFE SCIENCES
• Acknowledgment of Reviewers
• Summary
  • OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATION
  • A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING CONCERN CONTRIBUTES TO PLANNING
  • SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY EXPANDS WHAT IS POSSIBLE
  • A RANGE OF STRATEGIES IS NEEDED TO PREPARE AND RESPOND
• 1. Introduction
  • UNDERSTANDING SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
  • ASSESSING POTENTIAL BIODEFENSE CONCERNS
  • MITIGATING POTENTIAL BIODEFENSE CONCERNS
  • STUDY APPROACH
• 2. Biotechnology in the Age of Synthetic Biology
  • WHAT IS SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY?
  • IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGE OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
  • SPECIFIC SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY TECHNOLOGIES AND APPLICATIONS
• 3. Framework for Assessing Concern About Synthetic Biology Capabilities
  • APPROACH TO DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK
  • FACTORS FOR ASSESSING CONCERN
  • APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK IN THE ASSESSMENT OF CONCERN
• 4. Assessment of Concerns Related to Pathogens
  • RE-CREATING KNOWN PATHOGENS
  • MAKING EXISTING PATHOGENS MORE DANGEROUS
  • CREATING NEW PATHOGENS
  • SUMMARY
• 5. Assessment of Concerns Related to Production of Chemicals or Biochemicals
  • MANUFACTURING CHEMICALS OR BIOCHEMICALS BY EXPLOITING NATURAL METABOLIC PATHWAYS
  • MANUFACTURING CHEMICALS OR BIOCHEMICALS BY CREATING NOVEL METABOLIC PATHWAYS
  • MAKING BIOCHEMICALS VIA IN SITU SYNTHESIS
  • SUMMARY
• 6. Assessment of Concerns Related to Bioweapons that Alter the Human Host
  • MODIFYING THE HUMAN MICROBIOME
  • MODIFYING THE HUMAN IMMUNE SYSTEM
  • MODIFYING THE HUMAN GENOME
  • SUMMARY
• 7. Related Developments That May Impact the Ability to Effect an Attack Using a Synthetic Biology–Enabled Weapon
  • BARRIERS TO THE USE OF BIOWEAPONS
  • RELEVANT CONVERGENT TECHNOLOGIES
  • SUMMARY
• 8. Options for Mitigating Concerns
  • CURRENT MITIGATION APPROACHES AND INFRASTRUCTURE
  • MITIGATION CHALLENGES POSED BY SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
  • POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES TO ADVANCE MITIGATION CAPABILITIES
  • SUMMARY
• 9. Moving Forward: Conclusions and Recommendations
  • OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATION
  • CONCERNS POSED BY SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY–ENABLED CAPABILITIES
  • FUTURE USE OF THE FRAMEWORK
  • BIODEFENSE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGE OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
• References
• APPENDIXES
  • Appendix A. Specific Synthetic Biology Concepts, Approaches, and Tools
  • Appendix B. Selected Prior Analyses Used to Inform the Framework
  • Appendix C. Questions to Stimulate Consideration of Framework Factors
  • Appendix D. Committee Biographies
  • Appendix E. Disclosure of Conflict of Interest
  • Appendix F. Study Methods

Suggested citation:

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2018. Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: https://doi.org/10.17226/24890.