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Items: 18

1.

Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion.

Milinski M, Hilbe C, Semmann D, Sommerfeld R, Marotzke J.

Nat Commun. 2016 Mar 7;7:10915. doi: 10.1038/ncomms10915.

2.

Reliance on functional resting-state network for stable task control predicts behavioral tendency for cooperation.

Hahn T, Notebaert K, Anderl C, Reicherts P, Wieser M, Kopf J, Reif A, Fehl K, Semmann D, Windmann S.

Neuroimage. 2015 Sep;118:231-6. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.05.093. Epub 2015 Jun 10.

PMID:
26070266
3.

Costs for switching partners reduce network dynamics but not cooperative behaviour.

Bednarik P, Fehl K, Semmann D.

Proc Biol Sci. 2014 Oct 7;281(1792). pii: 20141661. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2014.1661.

4.

A comparative analysis of spatial Prisoner's Dilemma experiments: conditional cooperation and payoff irrelevance.

Grujić J, Gracia-Lázaro C, Milinski M, Semmann D, Traulsen A, Cuesta JA, Moreno Y, Sánchez A.

Sci Rep. 2014 Apr 11;4:4615. doi: 10.1038/srep04615.

5.

Consistent strategy updating in spatial and non-spatial behavioral experiments does not promote cooperation in social networks.

Grujić J, Röhl T, Semmann D, Milinski M, Traulsen A.

PLoS One. 2012;7(11):e47718. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0047718. Epub 2012 Nov 19.

6.

I dare you to punish me-vendettas in games of cooperation.

Fehl K, Sommerfeld RD, Semmann D, Krambeck HJ, Milinski M.

PLoS One. 2012;7(9):e45093. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0045093. Epub 2012 Sep 19.

7.

Conditional cooperation can hinder network reciprocity.

Semmann D.

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2012 Aug 7;109(32):12846-7. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1210294109. Epub 2012 Jul 27. No abstract available.

8.

Patch depletion, niche structuring and the evolution of co-operative foraging.

van der Post DJ, Semmann D.

BMC Evol Biol. 2011 Nov 17;11:335. doi: 10.1186/1471-2148-11-335.

9.

Local orientation and the evolution of foraging: changes in decision making can eliminate evolutionary trade-offs.

van der Post DJ, Semmann D.

PLoS Comput Biol. 2011 Oct;7(10):e1002186. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002186. Epub 2011 Oct 6.

10.

Co-evolution of behaviour and social network structure promotes human cooperation.

Fehl K, van der Post DJ, Semmann D.

Ecol Lett. 2011 Jun;14(6):546-51. doi: 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01615.x. Epub 2011 Apr 4.

PMID:
21463459
11.

How is human cooperation different?

Melis AP, Semmann D.

Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2010 Sep 12;365(1553):2663-74. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0157. Review.

12.

Human strategy updating in evolutionary games.

Traulsen A, Semmann D, Sommerfeld RD, Krambeck HJ, Milinski M.

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2010 Feb 16;107(7):2962-6. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0912515107. Epub 2010 Feb 8.

13.

Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.

Sommerfeld RD, Krambeck HJ, Semmann D, Milinski M.

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2007 Oct 30;104(44):17435-40. Epub 2007 Oct 18.

14.

Stabilizing the earth's climate is not a losing game: supporting evidence from public goods experiments.

Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck HJ, Marotzke J.

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2006 Mar 14;103(11):3994-8. Epub 2006 Mar 1.

15.

Volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game.

Semmann D, Krambeck HJ, Milinski M.

Nature. 2003 Sep 25;425(6956):390-3.

PMID:
14508487
16.

Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation.

Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck HJ.

Proc Biol Sci. 2002 May 7;269(1494):881-3.

17.

Reputation helps solve the 'tragedy of the commons'.

Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck HJ.

Nature. 2002 Jan 24;415(6870):424-6.

PMID:
11807552
18.

Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing strategy?

Milinski M, Semmann D, Bakker TC, Krambeck HJ.

Proc Biol Sci. 2001 Dec 7;268(1484):2495-501.

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