Free will without consciousness?

Liad Mudrik; Inbal Gur Arie; Yoni Amir; Yarden Shir; Pamela Hieronymi; Uri Maoz; Timothy O'Connor; Aaron Schurger; Manuel Vargas; Tillmann Vierkant; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong; Adina Roskies

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2022.03.005

Free will without consciousness?

Trends Cogn Sci. 2022 Jul;26(7):555-566. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.03.005. Epub 2022 Apr 12.

Authors

Affiliations

¹ School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel; Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel. Electronic address: mudrikli@tauex.tau.ac.il.
² School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.
³ Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.
⁴ Department of Philosophy, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA.
⁵ Department of Psychology, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866, USA; Institute for Interdisciplinary Brain and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, Irvine, CA 92618, USA; Anderson School of Management, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA; Division of Biology and Biological Engineering, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA.
⁶ Department of Philosophy, Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47401, USA.
⁷ Department of Psychology, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866, USA; Institute for Interdisciplinary Brain and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, Irvine, CA 92618, USA; INSERM U992, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Neurospin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette 91191, France; Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, Direction des Sciences du Vivant, I2BM, NeuroSpin Center, Gif sur Yvette 91191, France.
⁸ Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA.
⁹ School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, UK.
¹⁰ Philosophy Department, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA; Kenan Institute for Ethics, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA; Psychology and Neuroscience Department, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA; Duke University School of Law, Durham, NC 27708, USA.
¹¹ Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA.

PMID: 35428589
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.03.005

Abstract

Findings demonstrating decision-related neural activity preceding volitional actions have dominated the discussion about how science can inform the free will debate. These discussions have largely ignored studies suggesting that decisions might be influenced or biased by various unconscious processes. If these effects are indeed real, do they render subjects' decisions less free or even unfree? Here, we argue that, while unconscious influences on decision-making do not threaten the existence of free will in general, they provide important information about limitations on freedom in specific circumstances. We demonstrate that aspects of this long-lasting controversy are empirically testable and provide insight into their bearing on degrees of freedom, laying the groundwork for future scientific-philosophical approaches.

Keywords: decision-making; free will; subliminal priming; unconscious processes; voluntary action.

Publication types

Review
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

MeSH terms

Consciousness*
Humans
Personal Autonomy*
Volition