Three studies test whether group members strategically shift the standard of judgment they use to decide whether a particular ingroup action was unjust. In Study 1, individuals who were highly identified with their ingroup set higher confirmatory injustice standards than low identifiers-they needed more evidence to conclude that their group acted unjustly. This led to reductions in judgments of harm and diminished collective guilt. In Study 2, group identification was experimentally manipulated and the results of Study 1 were replicated. In Study 3, stronger support is provided for the motivational nature of this process. Specifically, the motivation to shift the standard upward was decreased by providing group members with an opportunity to self-affirm at the group level. Participants who self-affirmed set lower confirmatory standards of injustice, rated the harm as more severe, and experienced greater collective guilt than, those not self-affirming. Implications of this quantitative standard shifting are discussed.