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    Trends Cogn Sci. 2009 Jan;13(1):7-13. Epub 2008 Dec 6.

    Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood.

    Source

    Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. olaf.blanke@epfl.ch

    Abstract

    We highlight the latest research on body perception and self-consciousness, but argue that despite these achievements, central aspects have remained unexplored, namely, global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Researchers investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behaviour. We ask, what are the minimally sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self, that is, the fundamental conscious experience of being someone? What are necessary conditions for self-consciousness in any type of system? We offer conceptual clarifications, discuss recent empirical evidence from neurology and cognitive science and argue that these findings offer a new entry point for the systematic study of global and more fundamental aspects of self-consciousness.

    PMID:
    19058991
    [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]

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