Mating decisions contribute to both the fitness of individuals and the emergence of evolutionary diversity, yet little is known about their cognitive architecture. We propose a simple model that describes how preferences are translated into decisions and how seemingly disparate patterns of preference can emerge from a single perceptual process. The model proposes that females use error-prone estimates of attractiveness to select mates based on a simple decision rule: choose the most attractive available male that exceeds some minimal criterion. We test the model in the tungara frog, a well-characterized species with an apparent dissociation between mechanisms of mate choice and species recognition. As suggested by our model results, we find that a mate attraction feature alters assessments of species status. Next, we compare female preferences in one-choice and two-choice tests, contexts thought to emphasize species recognition and mate choice, respectively. To do so, we use the model to generate maximum-likelihood estimators of preference strengths from empirical data. We find that a single representation of preferences is sufficient to explain response probabilities in both contexts across a wide range of stimuli. In this species, mate choice and species recognition are accurately and simply summarized by our model. While the findings resolve long-standing anomalies, they also illustrate how models of choice can bridge theoretical and empirical treatments of animal decisions. The data demonstrate a remarkable congruity of perceptual processes across contexts, tasks, and taxa.