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J Health Econ. 1996 Jun;15(3):257-77.

Hospital response to prospective payment: moral hazard, selection, and practice-style effects.

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  • 1Department of Economics, Boston University, MA 02215, USA.

Abstract

In response to a change in reimbursement incentives, hospitals may change the intensity of services provided to a given set of patients, change the type (or severity) of patients they see, or change their market share. Each of these three responses, which we define as a moral hazard effect, a selection effect, and a practice-style effect, can influence average resource use in a population. We develop and implement a methodology for disentangling these effects using a panel data set of Medicaid psychiatric discharges in New Hampshire. We also find evidence for the form of quality competition hypothesized by Dranove (1987).

PMID:
10159442
[PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
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