![]() | ![]() |
Formats:
|
||||
Copyright World Psychiatric Association Evolution is the scientific foundation for diagnosis: psychiatry
should use it 1Department of Psychiatry, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA See the article "The concept of mental disorder: diagnostic implications of
the harmful dysfunction analysis" on page 149.Psychiatry has struggled for centuries to get mental disorders recognized
as diseases just like those in the rest of medicine. To pursue this goal,
the DSMIV and other new diagnostic systems define disorders based on the number,
severity and duration of symptoms. The benefit is that two clinicians who
examine the same patient will likely arrive at the same diagnosis. This seems
scientific. At least we can measure something reliably! However, as Wakefield points out, such diagnostic systems only appear scientific.
They offer no basis for deciding what is a disorder, and what is not. Worse
yet, while they are intended to make psychiatry more like the rest of medicine,
they do the opposite. In the rest of medicine, doctors recognize disorders
as conditions that arise from abnormal functioning of some useful system.
They know the heart evolved to pump blood and that insufficient function results
in congestive heart failure. Cardiac failure is the diagnosis whenever the
heart is not performing its normal function, no matter what the cause. The rest of medicine makes a sharp distinction between disorders and protective
responses. This distinction is mostly missing in psychiatry. Renal failure,
cancer and paralysis are disorders, but fever, cough and pain are not disorders,
they are protective responses. Fever and cough regulation mechanisms can fail,
but doctors hardly ever diagnose "fever disorder" or "cough disorder". Instead,
they look for the problem that aroused these functional responses. As Wakefield shows so clearly, psychiatric diagnosis ignores this fundamental
distinction. Major depression is diagnosed whenever severe enough symptoms
persist long enough, no matter what is happening in the person's life. The
exception, the recent death of a loved one, shows why considering context
is essential. Good psychiatrists examine the patient's life situation in detail
to try to understand whether the depression symptoms arise from a normal response
to the current life situation, an abnormality of the mood regulation system,
or, as is usually the case, some of both. This essential distinction between reactive and endogenous depression was
at the heart of DSM-II, but was eliminated in the DSM-III and IV. Ever since,
psychiatric diagnosis has appeared objective, while in fact separating itself
dramatically from diagnosis in the rest of medicine which relies on recognizing
dysfunction. Why did psychiatric diagnosis exclude consideration of context?
There are two obvious reasons. First, when diagnosis depends on assessing the severity of life problems,
reliability decreases. Whether or not loss of a job is sufficient to explain
depression symptoms depends on how good or bad the job was, whether it can
be easily replaced, and the person's financial situation. All of these factors
involve somewhat subjective judgments. Making these judgments means that two
diagnosticians will be less likely to come to the same conclusion. This can be difficult, but the rest of medicine does not ignore context.
For instance, when evaluating pain, physicians judge if this patient's pain
is within the normal range given the nature of the organic lesion, or if the
pain regulation system is not working properly. The decision is often difficult,
but doctors do not duck the problem by using only the severity and duration
of symptoms to determine if the patient has "pain disorder". Instead, they
use all their knowledge and experience to try to decide if this patient's
pain is a normal response, or if the system that regulates pain is abnormal. The second reason psychiatric diagnosis ignores context is because the
architects of the DSM-III were so desperate to separate psychiatry from psychoanalysis
that they decided to ignore all theory. As a result, we still lack the kind
of functional understanding that physiology offers to the rest of medicine.
However, a functional understanding is now available to psychiatry. For instance, determining when an emotion is abnormal requires understanding
what normal emotions are for (1). The
same evolutionary thinking that has rapidly advanced the study of animal behavior
is being applied to human emotions. Emotions evolved because they adjust the
body to deal with situations that have occurred again and again over millions
of years. No emotion is good or bad in general, and negative emotions such
as anxiety and sadness are just as useful as positive emotions. Emotions are
useful if they are expressed in the situation they evolved for, otherwise
they are abnormal (2). We must learn
to recognize those situations. More generally, individuals who lack emotions
don't do well in life. On average, across evolutionary history, they had fewer
children. People who have excessive emotions, or whose emotions are expressed
in the wrong situation, also do not do well. A panic attack is life-saving
when you are being chased by a lion but, in a romantic situation, panic can
severely decrease reproductive success! The judgment of dysfunction is based on understanding a trait's evolutionary
function. This is exactly the same for psychiatry as it is in the rest of
medicine. Wakefield argues persuasively that this provides a solid biological
basis for deciding whether a condition is normal or abnormal (3). This seems radical, but it is, instead, a call to return
psychiatric diagnosis to its proper grounding in biology (4). Adopting his perspective would bring psychiatric diagnosis
back into the biological framework that functional understanding provides
for the rest of medicine. References 1. Nesse RM. Evolutionary explanations of emotions. Human Nature. 1990;1:261–289. 2. Nesse RM. Proximate and evolutionary studies of anxiety, stress, and
depression: synergy at the interface. Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 1999;23:895–903. [PubMed] 3. Wakefield JC. Horwitz AV. New York: Oxford University Press; 2007. The loss of sadness: how psychiatry transformed normal sorrow
into depressive disorder. 4. Nesse RM. Jackson ED. Evolution: psychiatric nosology's missing biological foundation. Clin Neuropsychiatry. 2006;3:121–131. |
PubMed related articles
Your browsing activity is empty. Activity recording is turned off. |
|||
Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 1999 Nov; 23(7):895-903.
[Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 1999]