

Mortality traps and the dynamics of health transitions

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An examination of life expectancy in 1963 reveals twin peaks in the empirical distribution across countries: one group of countries clustered around a life expectancy of 40 years and a second group clustered around a life expectancy of 65 years. By 2003, the mode of each cluster had moved up by ≈ 10 years. Although the two groups are similar in that within each of them, there is progress toward higher life expectancy, a number of countries appear to have made the jump from the high-mortality cluster to the low-mortality cluster. We reject the hypothesis that these changes reflect a simple convergence process. The data instead suggest continuous advances among many countries within clusters, with advances in life expectancy in some nations resulting in a jump from one cluster to the other.

convergence | sustainable development | life expectancy

Recent studies suggest that since the late 19th century, gains in health have contributed more to human well being than has income growth (1, 2). Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a more remarkable global human achievement over the past two centuries than the greater-than-doubling of life expectancy—from an initial level of ≈ 30 years in 1800 (3). This global trend appears to have accelerated in recent decades, with life expectancy increasing more than 10 years between 1963 and 2003, from 52.3 years to 66.0 years. Continued improvements are widely expected, with global life expectancy plausibly projected to reach 81 years by the year 2100 (4).

But these global trends mask considerable cross-country heterogeneity. Mayer-Foulkes (5) observes that life expectancy dynamics appear to generate a number of “convergence clubs.” These clubs consist of countries with similar life expectancy that also appear to experience relatively uniform sets of changes in life expectancy. McMichael *et al.* (6) focus on the most recent century and draw attention to three groups of countries: those that have experienced rapid improvement in their life expectancy, those that have experienced relative stagnation in their life expectancy, and those that have experienced an erosion of life expectancy. This trichotomy leads McMichael and his colleagues to argue against a deterministic process of global gains and convergence in population health. These findings notwithstanding, life expectancy has tended to rise fastest among countries that had low life expectancy in the 1960s. This suggests a narrowing of life expectancy gaps between countries and the prospect of long-run convergence in population health among countries (7–11).

We argue in this article that the life expectancy data reflect a dynamic that is more complex than a simple convergence process. The distribution of health in the world is bimodal, with a group of healthy, low-mortality countries and a group of unhealthy, high-mortality countries. We show that the process of catch-up and convergence in health between these two is not smooth; some high-mortality countries make a rapid transition to low mortality, whereas others appear to be stuck in a “mortality trap” where high mortality persists. We provide evidence of a critical value, or health threshold, which needs to be achieved for catch-up in health to occur. The existence of a critical value and its magnitude, which may be governed by both health and nonhealth dimensions of development, has important

implications for how one should think about the sustainability of health and development and related policy interventions.

The central objective of this article is to construct a formal test of a single-regime versus a dual-regime trajectory of life expectancy. More specifically, we test a model of two convergence clubs, a high-mortality cluster and a low-mortality cluster, that allows for jumps between clubs (with a probability that may depend on initial life expectancy) against a model in which all countries follow the same continuous (although not necessarily linear) life expectancy trajectory. The data reject the latter model in favor of the two convergence club model. We find that all countries initially in the low-mortality cluster—that is, those with life expectancy of >55 years in 1963—have stayed in the low-mortality cluster. Some countries initially in the high-mortality cluster—with life expectancy of <55 years in 1963—have made, or are making, the transition to the low-mortality cluster, whereas others appear to be stuck in what we call a mortality trap.

Our results include a number of countries that have seen substantial declines in life expectancy since 1990 due to HIV/AIDS. However, our conclusions do not depend on the presence of HIV/AIDS; we show similar results using data on life expectancy that exclude the effect of AIDS mortality.

At the outset, we note also that our analysis identifies a mortality trap through a statistical analysis of levels and changes in country-level life expectancy data. It does not seek to offer or test hypotheses about the processes underlying the observed life expectancy patterns. We leave to future research the task of identifying possible factors (e.g., income growth, educational development, level and focus of foreign assistance, degree of democratization, governmental priorities, and budget allocations) that determine the critical value whose existence we seek to model and test.

Data

We rely on the Population Division of the United Nations for our data on life expectancy (12). The United Nations reports life expectancy figures for 192 countries at 5-year intervals over the period 1950–2005. The figures are based on the age-specific mortality rates prevailing within each 5-year interval. We follow the United Nations method and take life expectancy in 1963 (more precisely, at the beginning of 1963) to be that of the interval 1960–1965, whereas life expectancy in 2003 comes from the period 2000–2005. These are summary measures of the mortality schedule experienced by the population during the time interval and not the actual life expectancy of a true birth cohort.

The age-specific mortality rates are based on vital registration data, census age distributions, and survey information on infant

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


Fig. 2. Kernel density estimate of the distribution of life expectancy.

on the squared term in the regression and the dependence of the standard deviation of the residuals on initial life expectancy are statistically significant. Fig. 1 also shows the fitted values from Model 2, which now predicts that the largest gains in life expectancy occur in countries in the middle of the distribution of initial life expectancy. We find that the relationship between the gain in life expectancy and initial life expectancy resembles an inverted “U,” with large gains in countries with life expectancy of ≈ 50 years in the interval 1960–1965 but lower gains for countries that initially had higher or lower life expectancy. The model also shows there to be great heterogeneity in the experience of countries with low life expectancy initially, with some achieving large increases in life expectancy while life expectancy stagnated or decreased sharply in others. Relative to Model 1, this nonlinear relationship provides a better description of the evolution of life expectancy. Instead of uniform convergence, there is convergence on average with, notably, the largest gains in life expectancy for countries that initially have medium life expectancy.

The Mortality Trap

Although the quadratic model fits the data better than a linear model, it is not clear that it provides a description of the data that could not be improved upon further (and meaningfully) by alternative models. We therefore consider some nonparametric methods for describing the life expectancy data. Fig. 2 shows the distribution of life expectancy across countries in 1963 and again in 2003 by using a kernel estimator. The striking feature of these plots is the existence of twin peaks in the distribution of life expectancy. For the interval 1960–1965, some countries cluster around a low level of life expectancy, whereas others cluster around a high level of life expectancy; somewhat fewer countries appear between these two groups. This bimodal distribution is still evident (although less so) in the interval 1995–2000. Wilson (11) finds twin peaks that weaken over time when the country data are weighted by population rather than weighted equally. Over time, the mode of life expectancy in each cluster increases. In addition, some countries appear to have “jumped” from the low- to the high-life-expectancy cluster, with corresponding changes in the size of their peaks.

The explanation of Fig. 2 requires a more complex model of the evolution of life expectancy. We estimate the joint distribution of initial life expectancy and life expectancy change using a nonparametric kernel estimator. This allows us to construct an estimate of the empirical distribution of life expectancy changes




Fig. 3. Conditional probability of life expectancy change by initial life expectancy.

conditional on a particular initial life expectancy. We do this for life expectancy at intervals of a half year.

Fig. 3 shows a contour map of the probability density of each increase in life expectancy, conditional on initial life expectancy. For initial life expectancies of <40 years, the modal gain in life expectancy is just under 10 years. For life expectancies of >50 years, there is a clear, downward-sloping relationship between initial life expectancy and the modal outcome, with a tight distribution of outcomes around the mode. For initial life expectancy of ≈ 50 years, the modal gain is just under 20 years, whereas for countries with initial life expectancy of 70 years, the modal gain is a more modest 7 years. Between initial life expectancies of 40 and 50 years, the distribution of the life expectancy gains appears to be very diffuse.

Fig. 3 suggests a model with two regimes—one holding at high initial life expectancy and the other at a low initial life expectancy. We wish to examine this two-regime model formally and test it against the simpler single-regime models examined above. We assume that there are two regimes and that in each regime there is a relationship between initial life expectancy and the subsequent change in life expectancy. In theory, there could be a discontinuity as we vary initial life expectancy, with one regime holding below some critical value and another holding above it. Fig. 3, however, suggests that countries near the threshold have a chance of being in either regime. We allow for this by positing that there is a probability distribution that governs which state prevails for each country, where the parameters of the distribution are allowed to vary with initial life expectancy. These may reflect a genuinely random process; alternatively, one could imagine a process with a sharp discontinuity where the apparent randomness in outcomes is due to measurement error in initial life expectancy.

Formally, the model is

gains in life expectancy and can hope to eventually move out of the high-mortality group.

Although we do not address the issue of what drives the observed patterns of health improvement, some existing research bears on the mechanisms behind takeoffs in health and their association with takeoffs in other measures of development. Pritchett and Summers (20) argue that rising incomes and education levels drive health improvements. By contrast, Preston (21) argues that population health gains are mainly due to an upward shift in the relationship between health and income, with improvements in health over time at each fixed level of income. This is likely due to more effective use of resources, either through technical progress or improved organization and allocation decisions. Jamison, Sandbu, and Wang (22) and Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (23) emphasize the diffusion of health technologies and the implementation of public health measures that prevent the spread of infectious disease in developing countries. Health may also affect income levels (24), making it difficult to determine the direction of causality behind the observed association between health and income levels.

It is also important to note that changes in life expectancy may mask complex changes in the underlying schedules of age-specific mortality rates. In high-mortality settings, life expectancy is heavily influenced by mortality rates at young ages. On the other hand, Demetrius (25) and Keyfitz (26) show that reductions in mortality rates have less impact on life expectancy when life table entropy is low (i.e., when deaths are concentrated in a narrow age range). This situation typically occurs when life expectancy is high, making further gains in life expectancy more difficult. A more informative approach would be to focus on the movements in age-specific mortality rates. Unfortunately, long

time series of age-specific mortality rates are only available for a small number of countries.

The “twin peaks” in the distribution of health seen in Fig. 3 mirror the twin peaks in the distribution of income (27). It may well be that takeoffs in health and takeoffs in income levels, as well as changes in other measures of social and economic development, happen contemporaneously. Yet, although socioeconomic indicators of national development are highly correlated in a cross-section of countries, Easterly (28) observes that, over reasonably long periods of time, development indicators can move quite differently within a country—considerable progress can occur in one dimension of development while other dimensions stagnate or even regress.

The existence of a threshold in health has important policy implications. Sachs’s (29) argument for a sustained effort to aid African economies is based on the idea that these countries must escape a poverty trap. Similarly, the mortality trap justifies a “big push” approach to health to help countries reach and cross the low-mortality threshold. With limited resources, the largest health gains may be achieved by focusing on countries near the threshold, where small changes in health status can have large effects on those countries’ chances of escaping the mortality trap. The threshold effect can also be used as an argument to support the International Finance Facility (30), which aims to increase current development aid by borrowing against future aid funding. This approach has considerable merit if the payoffs to spending that pushes countries quickly across a threshold are large in comparison to lower payoffs of incremental funding.

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