- a proximate explanation of how the trait works,
- an evolutionary explanation of what the trait is for (1).
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Copyright World Psychiatric Association Evolutionary biology: a basic science for psychiatry 1Departments of Psychiatry and Psychology, and Institute for Social Research Evolution and Human Adaptation Program, University of Michigan, 426 Thompson St., Ann Arbor, MI 58104, USA One of the most basic advances in biology during the past twenty years
is the new clear recognition that two kinds of explanation are needed for
all biological traits:
These are not alternatives; both are necessary to a full understanding.
For instance, to explain why polar bears have white fur, we need to know both
the proximate reason why the fur is white (absence of genes for fur pigment),
and the selective advantage of white fur (polar bears with dark fur catch
fewer seals). Most medical research has focused on how the body works and on the proximate
factors that explain why some people get a disease and others do not. Darwinian
medicine asks a different, evolutionary, question. It asks why we all have
bodies that are vulnerable to disease (2,3). Why do we have an appendix and wisdom
teeth? Why are our coronary arteries so narrow? Why do we have eyes designed
inside out so that the nerves and arteries run between the light and the retina?
Why is breast cancer so common now? Why do so many people have anxiety and
depression? At first it seems that the answer is simple. Natural selection is a random
process, so it can't bring any trait to ultimate perfection. This is correct
and does explain some disease. However, recent more careful consideration
has highlighted several other evolutionary reasons why our bodies remain vulnerable
to disease: novel environmental factors that our bodies are not designed for,
design trade-offs that make us more vulnerable to disease but nonetheless
give a net benefit, pathogens that evolve faster than we do, and defenses
like pain and cough that seem like diseases but are actually protective mechanisms
shaped by natural selection. There is space here for only a few examples of
how an evolutionary approach provides a foundation for understanding mental
disorders. Some psychiatric disorders persist because natural selection is not strong
enough to eliminate the genes that cause them. Huntington's chorea is the
classic example. Because this autosomal dominant gene does not usually cause
symptoms until after the age of childbearing, it is not strongly selected
against and it spreads in certain family lines. Schizophrenia also results
from genetic factors and thus seems superficially similar, but an evolutionary
approach calls attention to the relatively uniform prevalence of about 1%
worldwide, and the substantially decreased reproduction of individuals with
schizophrenia in developed countries. How can we explain the uniform distribution
of schizophrenia, and the persistence of genes that decrease fitness? It may
be that vulnerability to schizophrenia results from many genes with small
effects that make them resistant to elimination by selection. It may also
be, however, that these genes also offer benefits, perhaps not to people with
schizophrenia, but to relatives who are not ill. These might be mental benefits
or they might be something as remote as ability to mount a strong immune response
to cholera or plague. A more speculative evolutionary explanation for the
persistence of schizophrenia is the possibility that very rapid selection
for language and cognitive ability over the past 100,000 years has pushed
some aspect of brain development close to a threshold which, if exceeded,
causes psychosis in a few unfortunate people. Some medical disorders result from living in a modern environment that
is poorly suited for bodies designed for life foraging on the African savannah.
For instance, the current epidemic of atherosclerotic heart disease seems
to result from such a mismatch between design and environment. In psychiatry,
eating disorders are a good example. Obesity has proximate explanations in
brain mechanisms that regulate eating, but to explain why half the people
in some developed countries are now overweight, an evolutionary approach is
needed. The general answer seems to be that selection to ensure adequate food
consumption has always been strong, but selection for mechanisms to prevent
excessive intake has been much weaker. When young people decide to lose weight
by dieting, the body knows only that too few calories are being taken in to
sustain life. The normal and adaptive response to a life-threatening famine
is to eat whatever food is available, quickly, in private. This is just what
bulimics do. The experience of lack of control causes additional fear of obesity,
which motivates more strenuous dieting, in a positive feedback cycle that
culminates in severe eating disorders. There are, of course, many individual
differences in genetics, brain chemistry, past life experiences, and personality
that make some people much more vulnerable to such disorders than others.
These are all proximate explanations. An evolutionary approach cannot explain
these individual differences, but it can help us to understand why the syndrome
exists at all, and why it is common now. Perhaps the most useful contribution of an evolutionary approach to mental
disorders is emphasis on the distinction between defects and defensive responses.
Most problems that bring patients to doctors are defenses. Cough, pain, fever,
vomiting and diarrhea are defenses shaped by natural selection to protect
us in certain situations. They are hidden until they are needed. A respiratory
infection stimulates regulation mechanisms that arouse cough and fever. As
most doctors know, blocking cough can make an ordinary infection fatal because
secretions are not cleared from the lungs. Fever is also useful because bacteria
cannot grow as well at higher temperatures. Vomiting and diarrhea clear toxins
and pathogens from the gastrointestinal tract. Note that all of these experiences
are aversive. People intensely dislike them and this is what brings them in
for treatment. Treatment often consists of using drugs to block the defense.
We use codeine to block cough, aspirin to block fever and analgesics to block
pain. This brings up a big question. If natural selection has shaped the mechanisms
that regulate these defenses, then why are they so often expressed excessively?
Much of the general practice of medicine consists of blocking these unpleasant
defenses, and most of the time this does not harm people. How can this be?
Here again, an evolutionary approach reveals the hidden sophistication of
the body. The regulation of defenses is governed by what has been called 'the
smoke detector principle' (4). We accept
smoke detectors that go off when the toast burns because we want to be absolutely
sure of a warning if there is a real fire. Similarly, the cost of vomiting
is small compared to the cost of a severe intestinal infection, so natural
selection has shaped a regulation mechanism that sets off the defense whenever
there is any real chance that an intestinal infection is present. This has
a profound implication: most human suffering is unnecessary in the specific
instances, even though it arises as part of nearly optimal regulation of a
normal defense. Our capacities for emotional suffering are also products of natural selection.
It is not always obvious how they are useful, but anxiety is a good place
to start. A person who lacked all anxiety would quickly become a meal for
a tiger. The capacity for anxiety is useful (5),
but many of our patients experience excessive anxiety. Much of this excess
can be attributed to the design of the regulation mechanism according to the
smoke detector principle. Specific brain mechanisms cause anxiety in all of
us, and differences in these mechanisms make some people inordinately anxious
in situations that don't bother most people at all. These are proximate explanations;
we also need evolutionary explanations for why anxiety exists at all and why
it is regulated in the way that it is. Practical implications come quickly from this perspective. Many people
with panic disorder, for instance, believe that their symptoms mean that they
have heart disease. Telling them that the symptoms are caused by panic is
helpful, but I have found it much more effective to explain that these symptoms
would be perfectly normal and useful if a tiger was coming. The syndrome of
panic is just a fight-flight reaction that is going off at the wrong time.
It is a false alarm. Furthermore, in dangerous environments, the body adjusts
the anxiety threshold downwards, just as it should to increase the level of
protection. Unfortunately, this system seems to be unable to distinguish between
a real life-threatening danger, and a useless panic attack. This is the evolutionary
reason why having one panic attack often leads to escalating cycles of panic.
In a dangerous environment it is also adaptive to stay close to camp. This
is, of course, what agoraphobics do and offers an evolutionary explanation
for the comorbidity of panic and agoraphobia. Our lives are so safe now, that
the whole system seems unnecessary. But, for our ancestors, the ability to
flee at the least hint of danger was essential, and a system to regulate the
threshold for flight as a function of the safety of the environment would
be crucial. This can help to explain how medications can offer lasting relief
from panic. By stopping the cycle of panic attacks, the person gradually begins
to experience the environment as safer, and the anxiety threshold again increases.
This explanation often helps patients to understand how a medication is doing
something more than 'covering up the symptoms'. Depression offers a more challenging problem. At first glance, it seems
impossible that there could be any benefit from lacking energy, being fearful,
and withdrawing from social life, to say nothing of the problems caused by
not eating or sleeping. Any discussion of depression must start by acknowledging
that it often is a pathological condition with no adaptive value. However,
what about more mild variation in states of motivation? Are there some situations
in which energy, enthusiasm and risk taking would be valuable? Are there some
situations in which lack of initiative, pessimism and fearfulness would be
useful? While much research is needed to explore these hypotheses in detail,
it seems likely that in propitious situations, where a small investment of
effort will likely bring large payoffs, a burst of effort and energy will
bring big rewards (6). In unpropitious
situations, where efforts will be wasted, the best thing to do may be nothing
at all. This seems hard to imagine for modern people who always have adequate
food and shelter. But imagine a deer waiting in deep snow for spring to come.
If it is starving, what should it do? An optimistic deer that wanders off
in search of nonexistent food will die much sooner than the one who just waits
and waits. High and low states of motivation are each useful, but only in
certain situations. For people now, of course, the availability of food is not a major influence
on mood. The resources that make the most difference to us are social. When
we experience our efforts as efficacious and bringing us friends and recognition,
mood goes up. When all efforts seem to be wasted or to bring danger, mood
goes down. One group of researchers has argued that depression is a state
of 'involuntary yielding' that protects against attack after a loss of social
position (7). Others see some depressions
as states of withdrawal in which the individual regroups to emerge with alternative
strategies (8). A major area of psychological
research on goal pursuit is very relevant, but relatively unknown in psychiatry.
The core idea is that most human action is organized by pursuit of large goals
and that there must be a mechanism to disengage effort from unreachable goals
(9,10).
If people persist in the pursuit of an unreachable goal, ordinary normal low
mood is likely to escalate into full-blown depression (11). Much clinical evidence supports this, including the
frequent remission of depression when someone finds a new strategy or truly
gives up a goal. Preliminary results from our epidemiological study confirm
this finding in a community sample. The next step is to find more efficient
ways to measure and record information about goal pursuit in humans, and to
look for the psychological and brain mechanisms that normally regulate motivation
and mood. With this information in hand, it should be easier to find the genes
that influence vulnerability to depression. There is a strong human tendency to seek unitary explanations for diseases,
and to think of multiple explanations as competing. This mistake has left
most investigations of mental disorders seeking only one half of a full biological
explanation. The remedy is to carefully pursue both evolutionary and proximate
explanations for each disease. Our bodies are amazingly well designed in many
respects, but they also have flaws that leave us vulnerable, flaws that make
sense in an evolutionary perspective. There is every reason to think that
the synergy between evolutionary and proximate approaches will soon bring
major advances in our understanding of mental disorders (12). References 1. Mayr E. The growth of biological thought: diversity, evolution, and inheritance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1982. 2. Williams GW. Nesse RM. The dawn of Darwinian medicine. Q Rev Biol. 1991;66:1–22. [PubMed] 3. Nesse RM. Williams GC. Why we get sick: the new science of Darwinian medicine. New York: Vintage; 1994. 4. Nesse RM. The unity of knowledge. New York: New York Academy of Sciences; 2001. The smoke detector principle: natural selection and the regulation
of defenses; pp. 75–85. 5. Marks IM. Nesse RM. Fear and fitness: an evolutionary analysis of anxiety disorders. Ethol Sociobiol. 1994;15:247–261. 6. Nesse RM. Is depression an adaptation? Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2000;57:14–20. [PubMed] 7. Sloman L. Price J. Gilbert P, et al. Adaptive function of depression: psychotherapeutic implications. Am J Psychother. 1994;48:1–16. [PubMed] 8. Gut E. Productive and unproductive depression. New York: Basic Books; 1989. 9. Klinger E. Consequences of commitment to and disengagement from incentives. Psychol Rev. 1975;82:1–25. 10. Emmons RA. Gollwitzer PM. The psychology of action: linking cognition and motivation to behavior. New York: Guilford Press; 1996. Striving and feeling: personal goals and subjective well-being; pp. 313–337. 11. Carver CS. Scheier MF. Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: a control-process
view. Psychol Rev. 1990;97:19–35. 12. Nesse RM. Proximate and evolutionary studies of anxiety, stress, and
depression: synergy at the interface. Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 1999;23:895–903. [PubMed] |
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Q Rev Biol. 1991 Mar; 66(1):1-22.
[Q Rev Biol. 1991]Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2000 Jan; 57(1):14-20.
[Arch Gen Psychiatry. 2000]Am J Psychother. 1994 Winter; 48(1):1-4.
[Am J Psychother. 1994]Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 1999 Nov; 23(7):895-903.
[Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 1999]