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Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Catastrophic Events. Dispensing Medical Countermeasures for Public Health Emergencies: Workshop Summary. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2008.

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Dispensing Medical Countermeasures for Public Health Emergencies: Workshop Summary.

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Current Challenges and Threats

Public health emergencies such as an intentional anthrax release, or infectious disease threats such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and pandemic influenza, highlight the ever-changing threats posed by acts of terrorism and other public health emergencies, while also underscoring the pressing reality of these events. However, these events present different stresses on the public health community. As discussed during the workshop, a bioterrorist event such an anthrax attack represents a deliberate attack that threatens our national security and our public health. A naturally occurring event such as an influenza pandemic is a public health crisis with national security implications (due to the numbers who might become ill—armed forces, public safety workers, etc.). Therefore, the key is for the nation to plan aggressively to counteract the threat of future public health emergencies, said Dr. Gerald Parker, the principal deputy assistant secretary in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). However, he asserted, the United States is unprepared to confront the full range of threats.

Another presenter noted that one of the main criticisms leveled at the federal government by the 9/11 Commission was a “failure of imagination,” underscoring the point that the government did not anticipate the nature of the threat and thus had no systems in place to counteract it. Many other presenters sounded the alarm that the public health system has been beleaguered since the 1980s (IOM, 1988) and is inadequately staffed for a widespread attack. Issues presented at the workshop as impediments to successful, comprehensive antibiotic countermeasure delivery to the population included labor, physical facility capacity, security, liability, and financial sustainability.

The anthrax example, Parker said, dramatically brings to light the seriousness of the threat and the nation’s lack of preparedness in two major ways. The first is the need to dispense countermeasures within an extremely short time window to minimize morbidity and mortality from anthrax. The second is the allure of anthrax or other biological toxins (e.g., ricin) to terrorist groups because of their relatively low cost and ease of production and dispersal. Many existing technologies can be used to disperse aerosolized forms of these agents over massive and heavily populated areas, posing a risk to hundreds of thousands of people (Baccam and Boechler, 2007).

Distribution of Medical Countermeasures: The Strategic National Stockpile

The magnitude of the challenge facing America requires experience in the logistics of wide-scale distribution and dispensing of countermeasures by all levels of government, and the private sector’s assistance is also crucial. The SNS, which was first established in 1998 as the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, is a national repository of medicine and medical supplies. The stockpiles are strategically located around the United States to ensure that once federal and local authorities agree that SNS deployment is needed, “12-hour push packs” of medications and/or supplies can be delivered to any designated receiving and storage site within 12 hours, while other managed inventory can be in place within 24 hours of the decision to deploy. Once the SNS materiel arrive at the designated site, state and local authorities assume responsibility for the materiel and oversee storage, distribution, and dispensing (CDC, 2008). Under this division of responsibility, the largest challenges and gaps are at the local level. It is widely believed that upon activation, the federal government would be able to distribute the necessary SNS materiel to state and local agencies within 12 to 24 hours. Public health officials could then begin dispensing from local caches, thus meeting the ideal dispensing time frame of 12 to 36 hours from SNS activation. However, most communities still lack adequate mechanisms and capacity to expeditiously dispense countermeasures to all of the exposed and potentially exposed populations, Parker said.

Dispensing Medical Countermeasures

The demands on local governments are extensive, and local officials may benefit from partnering with other sectors to develop solutions, noted Gregory Burel, the Senior Executive Service Director, Division of Strategic National Stockpile, CDC. A joint government–private partnership or a “community” response with government leadership is necessary to ensure the most positive outcome. The CRI, for example, provides federal pre-event or planning leadership through a federal program aimed at providing selected cities with technical assistance to expand their capacity to dispense countermeasures within this 48-hour window. Even so, it is important to acknowledge that the actual operational requirement still rests with state and local entities, and that is where the intergovernmental and nongovernment liaison is paramount. As will be highlighted throughout this document, public–private partnerships may be leveraged to assist in these efforts.

Challenges and Moving Forward

Countermeasure dispensing must harness all types of imaginative partnerships between public and private institutions, working together in ways tailored to individual community needs, Parker asserted. The challenge requires incentives for and commitments from the private sector to enter into innovative partnerships with government agencies, with benefits to each partner. Several presenters emphasized that community-level planning, capacity, training, and response would be improved by collaboration between public and private sectors.

Countermeasure dispensing at the local level depends on new and creative types of local partnerships, Parker said. Whatever their configuration, partnerships must be geared to each community’s needs. The public health system as a whole must also address the major gaps and obstacles to local dispensing of countermeasures, such as liability protection for participation by private partners, communication with the public, and security around dispensing sites. The task ahead is fundamentally important to national security and public health, Parker concluded.

Copyright © 2008, National Academy of Sciences.
Bookshelf ID: NBK4105

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